Legislative Proposals

Topic/Workgroup:  Associate Judges/Specialty Courts

Background and Purpose:  Form of the Record

Under the provisions of Texas Family Code Section 201.009, a court reporter may be provided during a hearing held by an associate judge appointed under Chapter 201 of the Code, and a court reporter must be provided only when the associate judge presides over a jury trial or a contested final termination hearing.  Thus, many records of hearings before associate judges are made by means such as electronic recording rather than by a court reporter.  The referring court should be permitted to use the record of the associate judge’s hearing in any form in which it is maintained.  The current provisions of Sections 201.009(e) and 201.015(c) of the Texas Family Code appear to limit the referring court’s ability to consider the record of the associate judge’s hearing only if it was made by a court reporter.

The Texas Family Code should be amended to allow a referring court to consider the record of the associate judge’s hearing in any form in which it is maintained.

Other Parties:

Presiding Judges

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Hunter/CSHB 3995

OCA Contact:

Mena Ramon

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Associate Judge Jurisdiction

Currently, child protection court associate judges appointed pursuant to Subchapter C of Chapter 201 of the Texas Family Code have jurisdiction over matters under Chapters 262 and 263 of the Family Code.  Such language is unduly restrictive.  For example, the child protection courts do not have jurisdiction to preside over cases filed by Texas Family and Protective Services seeking a court order to facilitate an investigation of abuse or neglect, as such actions are governed by Section 261, Texas Family Code. 

Section 201.201 of the Texas Family Code should be amended to provide jurisdiction to child protection court associate judges over matters within Title 5, Subtitle E of the Texas Family Code.

Other Parties:

Presiding Judges

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Hunter/CSHB 3995

OCA Contact:

Mena Ramon

Status:

Background:  Associate Judge Handgun Permit

Government Code Section 411.201(a) specifies the judicial officers who are eligible for a license issued by the Department of Public Safety to carry a concealed handgun under special requirements applicable only to judicial officers, but it does not include associate judges appointed pursuant to Chapter 201 of the Texas Family Code.

Purpose:   Including associate judges appointed pursuant to Chapter 201 of the Texas Family Code in the list of active judicial officers specified by Government Code Section 411.201(a) would extend the exemptions and qualifications for carrying a firearm already provided to other elected or appointed judges in Texas.

Other Parties:

Presiding Judges

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Harris/SB 916

OCA Contact:

Mena Ramon

Status:

Background and Purpose:  De Novo Hearings

Under the provisions of Texas Family Code Sections 201.015(i) and 201.2042, a party to a child protection case referred to an associate judge and tried to a jury is entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court.  A party may not demand a second jury in a de novo hearing before the referring court if the associate judge’s proposed order or judgment resulted from a jury trial.

Under the current application of Section 201.015(i), a party is in essence deprived of its right to a jury trial if the parents request a jury in the hearing before the associate judge, the jury finds parental rights should not be terminated, the associate judge’s proposed order or judgment conforms to the jury verdict then the Department of Family and Protective Services requests a de novo review and the referring court reverses the order of the associate judge.  By reversing the order or proposed judgment of the associate judge that was based on the jury verdict and terminating parental rights, the referring court deprives the parents of their right to a trial by jury in a proceeding in which their parental rights were subject to termination.

Section 201.2042 of the Texas Family Code should be amended to prohibit a request for a de novo hearing from an order or judgment of the associate judge rendered following a jury trial on any issue or finding which conforms to the jury verdict.  The order of the associate judge in conformity with the jury verdict should be deemed an order of the referring court.  A de novo hearing would still be allowed for a recommended order or judgment of an associate judge rendered notwithstanding the jury verdict or not in conformity with the jury verdict.

Prohibiting a de novo hearing by the referring court from an order or judgment of an associate judge rendered in conformity with a jury verdict would preserve the due process rights of the parties to child protection cases under Texas Family Code Chapter 201 Subchapter C.

Other Parties:

Presiding Judges

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Hunter/CSHB 3995

OCA Contact:

Mena Ramon

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Collections/Repaying Debts

Background and Purpose: Consistent Definition of Conviction

Criminal court costs are assessed against criminal defendants upon conviction.  Most statutes that call for the assessment of criminal court costs define the term “conviction.”  The precise wording differs, but all definitions define “conviction” to include deferred adjudication and/or deferred disposition.  A question arises in regard to the criminal court cost statutes that do not define “conviction.”  The question is whether the court costs should be assessed in deferred adjudication and deferred disposition cases.  Currently, the answer to this question is unclear. 

As a matter of primary importance, the statutes should be amended to define the term “conviction” for purposes of all criminal court costs.  As a matter of secondary importance, the statutes should be amended so as to provide for consistent wording of the definition of “conviction.”  

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Mandatory Refusal to Register

Current law permits (but does not require) a county tax assessor-collector and the Department of Transportation to refuse to register a motor vehicle if the owner of the vehicle owes money to the county for a fine, fee, or tax that is past due.  A fine, fee or tax is considered to be past due if 90 or more days have passed since the date the obligation was due.  Under current law, a county tax assessor-collector may only refuse to register a motor vehicle if the owner of the vehicle owes money to the tax assessor-collector’s county; if the owner of the vehicle owes money to the a different county, the tax assessor-collector may not refuse to register the vehicle. 

Make refusal to register motor vehicle mandatory if defendant fails to pay court costs and fines. Sections 502.185 and 702.003 of the Transportation Code should be amended to: (1) require county tax assessor-collectors and the Department of Transportation to refuse to register a motor vehicle of the owner of the vehicle owes money to the county for a fine, fee or tax that is past due; (2) consider money that is owed to a county or a city to be past due if 60 or more days have passed since the day the obligation was due; and (3) require a tax assessor-collector to refuse to register a motor vehicle if the owner of the vehicle owes money to any county. 

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Jim Lehman

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Simplify Court Costs

The State’s system of criminal court costs is complex.  Determining the correct amount of court costs to assess upon a conviction for a particular offense involves looking at a number of different statutes and settling certain factual questions.  Consequently, one cannot readily specify the amount of court costs for a particular offense.  Additionally, because the total amount of court costs to be assessed in a case is the sum of a number of individual court costs described in separate statutes, the overall effect that changes in court costs would have on criminal defendants is difficult to discern.  

Statutes concerning criminal court costs should be amended to make criminal court costs for particular offenses much easier to determine without changing the total amount of funds realized from court costs.  Specifically, the statutes should be amended to: (1) convert court costs that are assessed only if certain events occur into costs that are assessed in all convictions; (2) convert court costs that are assessed only upon conviction of certain offenses into fees that are assessed in all cases (or at least all felonies, all Class A and B misdemeanors, and all Class C misdemeanors); and (3) combine separate statutes that create criminal court costs into one broader statute that calls for the sum of the court costs, but continues to direct the court costs to the same destinations as is done currently.

Other Parties:

CSG Justice Center

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Whitmire/SB 2088

OCA Contact:

Carl Reynolds

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Court Reporter Certification Board [placeholder]

Background and Purpose:

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Michele Henricks

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:   Criminal Justice

Background and Purpose:  Public Access to Arrest Warrants

Article 15.26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically deals with public access to arrest warrants.  The statute clearly gives the public the right to inspect executed arrest warrants.  However, the statute is unclear as to whether the public has a right to access unexecuted arrest warrants.  In other words, a question exists as to whether arrest warrants are public information at all times or only upon their execution.

Clarify the law by amending Article 15.26 to clarify that unexecuted arrest warrants are confidential (as opposed to not being required to be released).

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Orders of Nondisclosure

Section 411.081 of the Government Code concerns orders of nondisclosure.  The statute is very confusing and is subject to different interpretations.  The statute can be interpreted to say that an order of nondisclosure does not require court clerks to keep relevant court records confidential.  But this is not the common understanding and is probably inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.

Amend Section 411.081 to clarify that court clerks must keep confidential court records that are the subject of an order of nondisclosure.

Other Parties:

Sen. Royce West

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Guardianship Certification Board [placeholder]

Background and Purpose:

Other Parties:

Sen. Carlos Uresti

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Lesley Ondrechen

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Indigent Defense

Background and Purpose:  Independent Assigned Counsel Programs

Lubbock County has recently established an independent assigned counsel program called the Lubbock Special Needs Public Defenders Office.  It is modeled on the private defender program in San Mateo, California where the county contracts with the local bar association to manage the assigned counsel system. It and similar programs elsewhere involve outsourcing to a governmental agency or nonprofit agency independent of the judiciary the responsibility for screening attorneys for court-appointment eligibility, assigning lawyers to individual cases, approving attorney fee requests, and approving requests for investigative and expert assistance.  These programs also may have responsibility for determining whether defendants are eligible for appointed counsel.  

This type of program provides jurisdictions with another option for delivering indigent defense services and relieves judges of most of the administrative burdens of managing indigent defense.  This type of program also comes closer to meeting national standards for public defense services than do the judicially-managed assigned counsel systems now common in Texas.  See American Bar Association, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (2002) (“[Principle] 1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel, is independent.”)

Amend Code of Criminal Procedure to better enable local jurisdictions to establish independent assigned counsel programs.  This proposal would involve (1) defining what an independent assigned counsel program is in the code, (2) amending art. 26.04 to allow counties to adopt local indigent defense policies that incorporate independent assigned counsel programs, and (3) amending art. 26.05 to allow for payment of attorney, investigator, and expert expenses incurred in independent assigned counsel programs.  The proposal would be strictly a local option and would require both the judges and county commissioners court assent to implement. 

Other Parties:

David Slayton

Andrea Marsh

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Duncan/SB 1710

OCA Contact:

Jim Bethke, Wesley Shackelford

Status:

Background and Purpose:  TFID Independence

The name “task force” implies a board of limited duration, while the Task Force on Indigent Defense is a permanent standing committee of the Texas Judicial Council.

Change name of Task Force on Indigent Defense to Texas Indigent Defense Council.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Wentworth/SB 625

OCA Contact:

Jim Bethke, Wesley Shackelford

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Creating PD Offices

Under current law, the process for establishing a public defender's office has been confusing and cumbersome for counties.  It has also required extensive additional work for counties that have decided they want to create a public defender as a county department.

Clarify and streamline the process of creating public defender offices.  The proposal allows a county to establish a public defender’s office as a county department, rather than requiring issuance of a request for proposals (RFP).  An RFP must still be issued if the county would like to establish the office by contracting with a non-profit corporation as the statute allows.  The bill also changes appropriate references from "public defender" to "public defender's office," as well changing the term "appointing" to "creating or designating."  Additional proposal is to amend CCP 26.044 to allow an oversight board to have full authority, rather than how it currently stands that each commissioners court retains authority over the public defender office.  The county commissioners could then jointly appoint the oversight board, consisting of county judges/commissioners, or those whom the commissioners court feel would be beneficial for the board. This is particularly important in the context of regional public defenders, such as the West Texas Capital Public Defender, where it is difficult to deal with the decisions by each of the 85 counties’ commissioners courts.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Wentworth/SB 159 & SB 625

OCA Contact:

Jim Bethke, Wesley Shackelford

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Indigent Representation Fund

Statutory changes were made to streamline the payment process for indigent inmate defense by 80^th Legislature and to the General Appropriations Act by the 81^st Legislature.  However, the legislature did not repeal the “indigent defense representation fund,” which was added to the statutes by the 80^th Legislature via HB 1267.  The “indigent defense representation fund” serves the same purpose as the Fair Defense Account established under section 71.058, Gov’t Code.  Moreover, the "indigent defense representation fund” is not included in the Funds Consolidation Bill of the 80^th Legislature. The “indigent defense representation fund” has never been funded, serves no purpose, and should be repealed from the statutes.

Purpose:   Delete indigent representation fund by amending Art. 26.05, Code of Criminal Procedure, to delete references to the fund contained in Subsection (i).

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Ellis/SB 2167 & SB 625

OCA Contact:

Jim Bethke, Wesley Shackelford

Status:

Background and Purpose:  PD Longevity Pay

The legislature authorized longevity pay for Assistant District Attorneys in 2001 and Assistant County Attorneys in 2005.  The legislation requires an attorney to remain in the public service capacity for four years.  After the four years of service, the attorney would be paid $80.00 per month and an additional $20.00 per month for each year of added service they had accrued.  Providing the same benefit for public defenders would reward and encourage long term employment in the criminal courts.  Experienced attorneys are valuable assets to the public defender’s offices of the state, and longevity pay would be an incentive to attorneys to stay with the office.  This would also enhance salary equity between similarly situated prosecutors and public defenders that is lacking now even in counties where prosecutors and defenders are on the same basic pay scale.

Authorize and provide longevity pay for public defenders in the state. In FY2008, based on 118 public defenders who would qualify for longevity pay the total cost is projected at $284,880.  The key issue is that a new a funding source is needed to provide this benefit since the revenue to the prosecutor longevity fund is not sufficient to cover this new pool of beneficiaries and the growing demand for benefits as the prosecutor workforce matures and grows.

Other Parties:

Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Alonzo/HB 199

OCA Contact:

Jim Bethke, Wesley Shackelford

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Judicial Administration

Background and Purpose:  Appointment of Presiding Judges

The state is divided into nine administrative judicial regions, with a presiding judge for each region. The presiding judges are the backbone of trial court administration in the state with duties including promulgating and implementing regional rules of administration, advising local judges on judicial management, recommending changes to the Supreme Court for the improvement of judicial administration, acting for local administrative judges in their absence, and assigning visiting judges to hold court when necessary to dispose of accumulated business in the region.

Currently, section 74.005 of the Texas Government Code provides that the Governor appoints the presiding judges for the nine administrative judicial regions.  The Texas Constitution places in the Supreme Court the responsibility of ensuring that justice in Texas is efficient. Similarly, the Legislature has statutorily charged the Court, under Texas Government Code section 74.021, with “administrative control over the judicial branch and . . . the orderly and efficient administration of justice.”  Further, under section 74.049 of the Texas Government Code, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas has the obligation to perform the duties of a regional presiding judge in the absence of that judge, and under section 74.001, the Chief Justice calls and presides over the annual meeting of the regional presiding judges. 

The Chief Justice currently makes appointments to the State Pension Review Board with the advice and consent of the Senate, providing a precedent for the procedure advocated here.

Judicial independence and the coherent administration of the Judicial Branch strongly suggest that section 74.005 should be amended to provide that the Chief Justice appoints the presiding judges to the administrative judicial regions, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Duncan/SB 992 '7.01

OCA Contact:

Carl Reynolds

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Jury Administration

The Supreme Court Task Force on Jury Assembly and Administration was formed in 2006.  The Task Force was charged with reviewing the Texas statutes and rules concerning the summoning of jurors, particularly Government Code Sections 62.001 – 62.501 and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 216 – 236.  The Task Force was comprised of 29 members including lawyers, judges, law professors, lay persons, and legislators.  Key Task Force recommendations include (1) expressly authorizing the Secretary of State to compile a master source list of jurors available for each county to summon; (2) directing each county to adopt a jury administration plan that must be approved by the Supreme Court (or the Court’s designee); (3) repealing Sections 62.001 – 62.018 and Section 62.021 that deal with jury administration; (4) amending the existing qualifications for jury service and exemptions therefrom; (5) clarifying and consolidating statutory penalties for those who fail to respond to a jury summons; (6) providing funding for the Secretary of State to improve the accuracy of juror lists, for counties to obtain software, for the training of jury assembly room managers, and the Supreme Court’s supervision of the jury plan process; (7) granting the Supreme Court express rulemaking authority to accomplish needed reforms; and (8) granting the Supreme Court express authority to ensure that counties prepare and adopt written jury plans.

Enact legislation consistent with the report of the Supreme Court Task Force on Jury Assembly and Administration.

Other Parties:

Judge David Peeples

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

Wentworth/ SB 1070; Gattis/ HB 3763

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  City Secretary Reporting

Current law requires the secretary of a Type A general-law municipality to notify the Texas Judicial Council of the name of each person who is elected or appointed as mayor, municipal court judge, or clerk of a municipal court of the municipality. The secretary must notify the judicial council within 30 days after the date of the person's election or appointment.

Effective January 1, 1984, the law was enacted to assist the Judicial Council in obtaining the names of persons to whom it must send notices in connection with the requirements for continuing legal education of municipal court judges. Since the Judicial Council no longer notifies judges about education requirements, this statute has become obsolete. The information is no longer used by the  Council, nor by the Office of Court Administration, and the requirement creates unnecessary work for the city secretaries to whom this statute applies.

Amend Local Government Code, Sec. 22.073 in order to eliminate the city secretary’s obligation to report this information to the Judicial Council.

Other Parties:

TML

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Angela Garcia

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Reporting Requirements

Section 72.085 of the Government Code requires the Court of Criminal Appeals to report four separate measures of court activity to the Office of Court Administration (OCA).  Two of the measures (involving capital punishment, applications for writs of habeas corpus, and petitions for discretionary review) are already being reported to OCA.  The two other measures (relating to the average disposal times for cases involving the same matters as listed in the foregoing sentence) are of little utility to the Court of Criminal Appeals or to anyone else.

Section 72.086 of the Government Code requires the Supreme Court to report certain measures of court activity to OCA.  Several of the measures (e.g., number of cases filed with the court) are already reported to OCA.  The remaining measures (e.g., average number of days from the date of oral argument to issuance of a signed opinion) are of little utility to the Supreme Court or to anyone else.

Additionally, a rider to Senate Bill 1 during the 79^th Legislature requires each district judge to provide an annual report indicating the judge’s clearance rate to OCA.  (A clearance rate is calculated by dividing the total number of cases disposed by the total number of cases added to the docket.)  There has never been any compliance with this requirement.

Amend the relevant Government Code and other provisions to eliminate these reporting requirements.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Angela Garcia

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Vexatious Litigant Reporting

Section 11.104 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires court clerks to provide the Office of Court Administration (OCA) with copies of any orders declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant and prohibiting that person from filing, in propria persona, any new litigation in a court of this state.  In turn, OCA is directed to maintain a list of vexatious litigants subject to prefiling orders.  OCA maintains this list on its website, see http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/vexatiouslitigants.asp .

A question has arisen as to whether OCA should place the name of a vexatious litigant on the list where the case in which the person is found to be a vexatious litigant is on appeal.  Appellate court clerks have also asked for clarification of their duties when a vexatious litigant files an appeal.

Amend Chapter 11 of the Civil Practices & Remedies Code to permit OCA to place the name of such a person on its list of vexatious litigants with an accompanying notation that the case is on appeal, and to provide that appellate court clerks should refuse to allow filing of any case other than an appeal of the case that finds the litigant is vexatious.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Angela Garcia

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:   Judicial Compensation Commission [placeholder]

Background and Purpose: 

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Angela Garcia

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:   Judicial Conduct Commission [placeholder]

Background and Purpose: 

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Mena Ramon

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Municipal Courts

Background and Purpose:  Appeal from Municipal Court

Alexander v. State, 240 S.W.3d 72 (Tex.App.—Austin 2007, no pet.), held that a person who is convicted in a municipal court of record and fined $100 or less cannot appeal past the county court level – even if the issue to be appealed is a constitutional challenge to the ordinance or statute on which the conviction is based.  This is in contrast to a person who is convicted in a municipal court that is not a court of record who can appeal past the county court level (i.e., to the court of appeals) if he or she is fined $100 or less and the issue to be appealed is a challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance or statute on which the conviction is based. 

The court questioned the result as a matter of policy and said, “[w]e invite the legislature to revisit the issue and amend section 30.00027(a) [of the Government Code] to permit appeals of constitutional issues without regard to the amount of the fine.”

Amend Section 30.00027(a) to permit appeals of constitutional issues from municipal courts of record without regard to the amount of the fine.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Municipal Court Venue

Blankenship v. State, 170 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005) dealt with a venue issue that arose because of the wording of art. 45.019, Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), which sets out the required contents of a complaint in a criminal case.

In Blankenship, the City of Austin charged the defendant with violations of several building-related ordinances on property that was located in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). Under art. 45.019(c) of the CCP, a complaint filed in municipal court must allege that the offense was committed in the territorial limits of the municipality in which the complaint was made. The city’s complaint did conform to this requirement, even though the offense actually occurred outside the city’s territorial limits. As a result, the prosecution was faced with a variance between the venue alleged and the venue proven. In this case, the court found the error to be harmless, but noted that the state was burdened with this problem until a legislative revision addresses it.

The wording of art. 45.019 puts cities in a bind. They are authorized to enforce certain ordinances in their ETJ but are required to (falsely) state in any complaint that the offense occurred within the city limits.

Amend art. 45.019(c) CCP to allow a complaint filed in municipal court to allege either that: (1) the offense was committed in the territorial limits of the municipality in which the complaint is made or (2) the offense was committed in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality in which the complaint is made.

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Topic/Workgroup:  Municipal and Justice Courts

Background and Purpose:  Commercial Drivers License Holder Loophole

Under current state law, the holder of a commercial driver’s licenses (CDL) is not eligible for deferred disposition in justice and municipal court. See  Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Arts. 45.051, 45.0511.  The state law is consistent with federal requirements.   However, CDL holders are eligible for deferred adjudication when appealing justice and municipal court convictions to county-level courts.  This loophole encourages CDL holders to appeal cases from justice courts and non-record municipal courts to the county courts thereby thwarting the intent of the law to not allow CDL holders to obtain deferred disposition for traffic violations. 

Amend Article 42.12, Section 5(d) to prohibit county courts from granting deferred adjudication to CDL holders who appeal convictions for traffic violations from justice and municipal courts.

Other Parties:

Texas Court Clerks Association

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Compliance Dismissal Uniformity

A number of laws permit certain Class C misdemeanor charges to be dismissed upon proof of compliance.  For example, a defendant who is charged with the offense of driving with an expired motor vehicle registration is entitled to have the charge dismissed if he or she: (1) remedies the defect (i.e.., obtains a current vehicle registration sticker) before the later of the defendant’s first court appearance date or the 20th working day after the date of the offense; and (2) pays an administrative fee not to exceed $20. See Tex. Transportation Code, Sec. 502.407.  There are many similar offenses that allow for these “compliance dismissals.”  See e.g., Tex. Transp. Code, Section 548.605 (expired inspection sticker).  The time within which a defect must be remedied and the amount of the administrative fee varies from offense to offense.  Court clerks have difficulty dealing with compliance dismissals because of the varying time periods within which a defect must be remedied and the varying administrative fee amounts. If time periods and administrative fee amounts were uniform from offense to offense, then the task of court clerks would be easier and errors would be reduced.  According to OCA statistics, there were 437,845 compliance dismissals in municipal courts in fiscal year 2009.  (There is no report on the number of compliance dismissals in justice courts.)     

Amend relevant sections of the Transportation Code to standardize: (1) the time period within which a defect must be remedied; and (2) the amount of the administrative fee. 

Other Parties:

Texas Court Clerks Association

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Expand Time to Make Motion for New Trial

Under current law, a defendant in a criminal case in justice or municipal court has only one day after the rendition of judgment to make a motion for new trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 45.037.  This period of time is unreasonably short and results in many defendants missing the opportunity to make a motion for new trial.  By comparison, in civil cases In justice court, a party has five days after the rendition of judgment to make a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 569.  Also by comparison, in criminal cases in county and district courts, the defendant has 30 days to file a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4.  

Amend Article 45.037 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to permit a defendant in a criminal case in justice or municipal court to make a motion for new trial within five days after the rendition of judgment.   

Other Parties:

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Notice of Standard Fine and Costs 

A defendant charged with a Class C misdemeanor may mail a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the relevant justice or municipal court.  If the plea is not accompanied by payment, current law requires the court to notify the defendant of the standard amount of the fine and court costs in the case.  Such notification must be made by certified mail. See  Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 27.14.  Sending such notices by certified mail entails considerable time and expense.  Notice by regular mail or e-mail should be sufficient.   

Amend Article 27.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow courts to notify defendants (who plead guilty or nolo contendere to Class C misdemeanor charges by mail and who do not also send payment) of the standard amount of the fine and court costs in the case by means of regular mail or e-mail.

Other Parties:

Texas Court Clerks Association

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status:

Background and Purpose:  Vehicle Impoundment for No Insurance Violations

Current Law requires courts to order the sheriff to impound the motor vehicle of a defendant who is twice convicted of a no-insurance violation (failure to maintain financial responsibility). See Tex. Transp. Code, Section 601.261.  Many courts are reluctant to order vehicle impoundment and would like to be able to pursue other means of encouraging compliance.  Making vehicle impoundment optional would give judges more options in second no-insurance cases.   Additionally, some municipal judges are reluctant to order the sheriff to perform the impoundment, but would be comfortable ordering the city police chief to perform the impoundment.           

Amend Sections 601.261 and 601.267 to make vehicle impoundment optional and to permit municipal courts to order the city’s police chief to perform any impoundments that are ordered.

Other Parties:

Texas Court Clerks Association

81^st Sponsor/Bill:

OCA Contact:

Ted Wood

Status: